Monday, September 28, 2009

Where Roadkill Meets the Road

So General Vance is upset that our "model village" - or possibly our Potemkin Village - didn't follow the script.

"A trip by Canada's top soldier in Afghanistan to the model community where troops are implementing a long-term security strategy turned into a lesson on the limits of Canadian tolerance."

Or, it turned into a lesson in reality for Canadian fantasists, much as the Tet Offensive of 1968 turned into a lesson in reality for American fantasists.

You know, there's really no future in saving people from themselves. There is, however, a future in being honest with our troops.

Thursday, September 24, 2009

Honesty as an exit strategy


NATO Briefing Paper on Afghanistan

Top Secret

1.We fucked up.
2.Current NATO policy on Afghanistan was established by a delusional American government.
3.None of the NATO allies, including Canada, had the balls to say the emperor had no clothes, or brains.
4.Afghanistan cannot be stabilized, occupied – call it what you will – without a foreign army of at least 500,000.
5.“Training” Afghan security forces is a joke.
6.There is no possible way of raising a NATO occupation force of 500,000.
7.Even if there was such a force in the field, it would destabilize much of central Asia, NATO, and possibly China.
8.It's time to turn out the lights and go home.
9.Afghanistan does not have to be “abandoned”. Spending some of the useless billions now being expended on military hardware would fund the UN mine clearing program forever.
10.We could buy the opium crop. It would be cheaper.

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

Dieppe in Slow Motion (continued)

"Thus the enemy would have a triumph and we would have a disaster, which would be of no good to anyone."

Winston Churchill talking to Stalin at the Kremlin, one week before the Dieppe Raid, August 12, 1942

“Whether the affair [the Dieppe Raid] was in fact the out-and-out failure which many believed it to be, and if it was, how much responsibility should properly be attributed to Mountbatten are questions which can be answered only if one has decided what it was supposed to achieve. Yet this fundamental question proves extraordinarily difficult to answer. Brian McCool, the Principal Military Landing Officer, was interrogated by the Germans for two days after his capture. At the end he was asked: “Look, McCool, it was too big for a raid and too small for an invasion. What was it?’ ’If you can tell me the answer,’ he replied, ‘I would be very grateful.’”

Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten, New York : Harper & Row, 1986, ©1985, pg 186


“Dieppe was a pathetic failure. Sixty years later, it seems obvious that Jubilee was a bizarre operation with no chance of success whatsoever and likely to result in a huge number of casualties. In August 1942, British and Allied officers did not have yet the knowledge and combat experience to make a proper assessment of the risks of such an operation. This catastrophe was useful precisely in providing that knowledge which was later to make victory possible.”

The Juno Beach Centre



And even that usefulness is debatable. A week before the operation (August 12, 1942), Churchill met Stalin at the Kremlin and Stalin bugged Churchill about opening a second front in France to take the heat off the Russians in the east. This was a recurring demand.








And so a week later, they launched the Dieppe Raid, Churchill already having said it would be useless, predicted a disaster, and demonstrated at the same time he had an appreciation of what it would really take to land an army in Normandy, meaning Dieppe wasn’t necessary even as a test run for D- Day, the lessons being known in advance.

At least they got the guys off the beach at Dieppe. Now we’re up to 130 deaths, an unspecified number of wounded in Afghanistan, and at Dieppe the comparable numbers were, 913 killed over about nine hours. So we’re getting there, up to about 14%. Fortunately, in Afghanistan there are no prisoners. Otherwise, except for the time scale, there are horrible similarities: the lack of any clear purpose, the lack of resources, and the known dangers being the most obvious.

However, if we were to draw any conclusions, the obvious would be:

1. Get the guys off the beach (out of Afghanistan).
2. If NATO really wants to occupy Afghanistan, it would take upwards of 500,000 troops.
3. Canada owes it to its troops to be honest about the objective, and if the objective isn’t doable, or if NATO isn’t going to be honest about what it’s doing and contribute the resources necessary, we should pull out.

We didn’t need another Dieppe. But we’ve got one.

Thursday, September 10, 2009

Night in Afghanistan



"At the end of Night, the immediate devastation has ended: the war is over, the camps are liberated, the author is alive. But the ongoing devastation has only begun, the devastation that will never end: the devastation imposed by memory, that makes the line between life and death a thin line indeed. The descriptive term imaging the author at the book's end is that of a corpse."

Elie Wiesel
Night
Translated from the French by Stella Rodway
Forward by François Mauriac
Preface for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition by Robert McAfee Brown
Bantam Books
Toronto. 1960, psge vi

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Fisking Christie Blachford

So the Globe and Mail, Canada’s National Newspaper, has an opinion piece on its front page by Christie Blachford, extolling the virtues of the reporter who was kidnapped and freed in Afghanistan

Lovely.

By that standard - I’m just starting in on the ironies - Christie should be a big fan of Robert Fisk, not mentioned in her elegy for journalistic honesty, a guy who was in the Shatila and Sabra refugee camp just after the massacre by Phalangist forces in 1982,who was at the front lines in the Iran-Iraq war, who was in Qana just after the UN post had been shelled by Israelis, documented by Frederick von Kappen, who was in Baghdad on the eve of the 2003 invasion, reporting the details of cruise missiles that killed Iraqi civilians, and was in Afghanistan to interview Osama bin Laden without the need for interpreters – “terps” in Christies’s cool laconic journalist jargon – because he speaks the fucking language.

What’s missing here is simple honesty – journalistic intellectual integrity – which somehow gets lost in the purple prose Christie uses for crime reporting. If somebody was interested in the civilian casualties caused by NATO shelling, they’d go back to the previously documented hit on May 4, 2009:

 “While this investigation assesses approximately 26 civilian casualties based on information from various sources and on new graves in the Gerani area in early May, no one will ever be able conclusively to determine the number of civilian casualties that occurred on Mary 4, 2009.  This investigation does not discount the possibility that more than 26 civilians were killed in this engagement.  Additionally, the investigative tam notes that the report by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, published on May 26, 2009, represents a balanced, thorough investigation into the incident, citing as many as 86 civilian casualties, with appropriate lessons learned for all involved in the fighting on May 4th – U.S. Afghan, and Taliban.”

That report concluded that as many as 86 civilians had been killed.  There has been no follow-up.

If somebody wanted to back out into the field, using methodology developed during the investigations by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, there would be truth enough for journalists without risking their lives for “eyes on the ground”. What we really need is “eyes on history”, a perspective noticeably lacking in Christie Blachford’s approach to reality in Afghanistan,and ISAF's approach to Farah, which is to pretend it didn't happen.

What we need particularly is somebody in Brussels asking hard questions of NATO and its fractious dishonest members, questions like:

1. What risk does Afghanistan pose to NATO?

2. Why is NATO?

3. Why can’t NATO’s discussions about Afghanistan occur in “open court”?

Saturday, August 29, 2009

Memo to Eric Holder -- International Law takes precedence over yours

29 August, 2009

Mr. Eric Holder
Attorney-General
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Dear Eric,

I see that you have appointed somebody to look into American war crimes.


"U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder appointed Assistant United States Attorney John Durham to investigate torture by U.S. officials since President Bush commenced the “war on terror,” but in the same act also gave political cover from that prosecutor to anyone who actually committed torture.

"Holder announced the August 24 appointment with the proviso that anyone who engaged in torture at the urging of senior Bush administration officials would be exempted from prosecution. Holder said torturers “need to be protected from legal jeopardy when they act in good faith and within the scope of legal guidance. That is why I have made it clear in the past that the Department of Justice will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees. I want to reiterate that point today, and to underscore the fact that this preliminary review will not focus on those individuals.”


I've got a news flash for you, Eric, it doesn't work. This particular news flash was perhaps best articulated by Winston Churchill in 1950, in "The Grand Alliance" Houghton Mifflin, Boston, pg. 368:

"It is impossible to complete this account without referring to a terrible decision of policy adopted by Hitler towards his new foes, and enforced under all the pressure of the mortal struggle in vast barren or ruined lands and winter horrors. Verbal orders were given by him at a conference on June 124, 1941, which to a large extend governed the conduct of the German Army towards the Russian troops and people and let to many ruthless and barbarous deeds. According to the Nuremberg documents, General Halder testified:

"Prior to the attack of Russia the Fuehrer called a conference of all the commanders and persons connected with the Supreme command on the question of the forthcoming attack on Russia. I cannot recall the exact date of this conference...At this conference the Fuehrer stated that the methods used in the war against the Russians would have to be different from those used against the West...He said the struggle between Russia and Germany was a Russian struggle. He stated that since the Rrussians were not signatories of the Hague Convention the treatement of their prisoners of war did not have to follow the Articles of the Convention...He [also] said that the so-called Commissars should not be considered prisoners or war.

"And according to Keitel:

"Hitler's main theme was that this was the decisive battle between the two ideologies and that this fact made it impossible to use in this war [with Russia] methods, as we soldiers knew them, which were considered to be the only correct ones under international law."

Keitel was hung at Nuremberg, Eric, just in case you were thinking of international travel in the near future.

And just so you know where you stand, here are the Nuremberg Principles that the United States of America - that's you, Eric - signed up for, beginning with the London Charter of August 8, 1945. I'm giving you the Full Monty:

I. CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

Article 1.

In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of August 1945 by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall be established an International Military Tribunal (hereinafter called "the Tribunal'') for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.

Article 2.

The Tribunal shall consist of four members, each with an alternate. One member and one alternate shall be appointed by each of the Signatories. The alternates shall, so far as they are able, be present at all sessions of the Tribunal. In case of illness of any member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some other reason to fulfill his functions, his alternate shall take his place.

Article 3.

Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can be challenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or their Counsel. Each Signatory may replace its members of the Tribunal or his alternate for reasons of health or for other good reasons, except that no replacement may take place during a Trial, other than by an alternate.

Article 4

(a) The presence of all four members of the Tribunal or the alternate for any absent member shall be necessary to constitute the quorum.

(b) The members of the Tribunal shall, before any trial begins, agree among themselves upon the selection from their number of a President, and the President shall hold office during the trial, or as may otherwise be agreed by a vote of not less than three members. The principle of rotation of presidency for successive trials is agreed. If, however, a session of the Tribunal takes place on the territory of one of the four Signatories, the representative of that Signatory on the Tribunal shall preside.

(c) Save as aforesaid the Tribunal shall take decisions by a majority vote and in case the votes are evenly divided, the vote of the President shall be decisive: provided always that convictions and sentences shall only be imposed by affirmative votes of at least three members of the Tribunal.

Article 5.

In case of need and depending on the number of the matters to be tried, other Tribunals may be set up; and the establishment, functions, and procedure of each Tribunal shall be identical, and shall be governed by this Charter.

II. JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Article 6.

The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to m Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes.

The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:

(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

(c)CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.

Article 7.

The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.

Article 8.

The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

Article 9.

At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization.

After the receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as it thinks fit that the prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make such declaration and any member of the organization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the organization. The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard.

Article 10.

In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individual to trial for membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned.

Article 11.

Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before a national, military or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime other than of membership in a criminal group or organization and such court may, after convicting him, impose upon him punishment independent of and additional to the punishment imposed by the Tribunal for participation in the criminal activities of such group or organization.

Article 12.

The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his absence.

Article 13.

The Tribunal shall draw up rules for its procedure. These rules shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter.

III. COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

Article 14.

Each Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecutor for the investigation of the charges against and the prosecution of major war criminals.

The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following purposes:

(a) to agree upon a plan of the individual work of each of the Chief Prosecutors and his staff,

(b) to settle the final designation of major war criminals to be tried by the Tribunal,

(c) to approve the Indictment and the documents to be submitted therewith,

(d) to lodge the Indictment and the accompany documents with the Tribunal,

(e) to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its approval draft rules of procedure, contemplated by Article 13 of this Charter. The Tribunal shall have the power to accept, with or without amendments, or to reject, the rules so recommended.

The Committee shall act in all the above matters by a majority vote and shall appoint a Chairman as may be convenient and in accordance with the principle of rotation: provided that if there is an equal division of vote concerning the designation of a Defendant to be tried by the Tribunal, or the crimes with which he shall be charged, that proposal will be adopted which was made by the party which proposed that the particular Defendant be tried, or the particular charges be preferred against him.

Article 15.

The Chief Prosecutors shall individually, and acting in collaboration with one another, also undertake the following duties:

(a) investigation, collection and production before or at the Trial of all necessary evidence,

(b) the preparation of the Indictment for approval by the Committee in accordance with paragraph (c) of Article 14 hereof,

(c) the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of all Defendants,

(d) to act as prosecutor at the Trial,

(e) to appoint representatives to carry out such duties as may be assigned them,

(f) to undertake such other matters as may appear necessary to them for the purposes of the preparation for and conduct of the Trial.

It is understood that no witness or Defendant detained by the Signatory shall be taken out of the possession of that Signatory without its assent.

IV. FAIR TRIAL FOR DEFENDANTS

Article 16.

In order to ensure fair trial for the Defendants, the following procedure shall be followed:

(a) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in detail the charges against the Defendants. A copy of the Indictment and of all the documents lodged with the Indictment, translated into a language which he understands, shall be furnished to the Defendant at reasonable time before the Trial.

(b) During any preliminary examination or trial of a Defendant he will have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him.

(c) A preliminary examination of a Defendant and his Trial shall be conducted in, or translated into, a language which the Defendant understands.

(d) A Defendant shall have the right to conduct his own defense before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of Counsel.

(e) A Defendant shall have the right through himself or through his Counsel to present evidence at the Trial in support of his defense, and to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution.

V. POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL AND CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL

Article 17.

The Tribunal shall have the power

(a) to summon witnesses to the Trial and to require their attendance and testimony and to put questions to them

(b) to interrogate any Defendant,

(c) to require the production of documents and other evidentiary material,

(d) to administer oaths to witnesses,

(e) to appoint officers for the carrying out of any task designated by the Tribunal including the power to have evidence taken on commission.

Article 18.

The Tribunal shall

(a) confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the cases raised by the charges,

(b) take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause reasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and statements of any kind whatsoever,

(c) deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate punishment, including exclusion of any Defendant or his Counsel from some or all further proceedings, but without prejudice to the determination of the charges.

Article 19.

The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and nontechnical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to be of probative value.

Article 20.

The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature of any evidence before it is entered so that it may rule upon the relevance thereof.

Article 21.

The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also take judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of the United Nations, including the acts and documents of the committees set up in the various allied countries for the investigation of war crimes, and of records and findings of military or other Tribunals of any of the United Nations.

Article 22.

The permanent seat of the Tribunal shall be in Berlin. The first meetings of the members of the Tribunal and of the Chief Prosecutors shall be held at Berlin in a place to be designated by the Control Council for Germany. The first trial shall be held at Nuremberg, and any subsequent trials shall be held at such places as the Tribunal may decide.

Article 23.

One or more of the Chief Prosecutors may take part in the prosecution at each Trial. The function of any Chief Prosecutor may be discharged by him personally, or by any person or persons authorized by him.

The function of Counsel for a Defendant may be discharged at the Defendant's request by any Counsel professionally qualified to conduct cases before the Courts of his own country, or by any other person who may be specially authorized thereto by the Tribunal.

Article 24.

The proceedings at the Trial shall take the following course:

(a) The Indictment shall be read in court.

(b) The Tribunal shall ask each Defendant whether he pleads "guilty" or "not guilty.''

(c) The prosecution shall make an opening statement.

(d) The Tribunal shall ask the prosecution and the defense what evidence (if any) they wish to submit to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall rule upon the admissibility of any such evidence.

(e) The witnesses for the Prosecution shall be examined and after that the witnesses for the Defense. Thereafter such rebutting evidence as may be held by the Tribunal to be admissible shall be called by either the Prosecution or the Defense.

(f) The Tribunal may put any question to any witness and to any defendant, at any time.

(g) The Prosecution and the Defense shall interrogate and may crossexamine any witnesses and any Defendant who gives testimony.

(h) The Defense shall address the court.

(i) The Prosecution shall address the court.

(j) Each Defendant may make a statement to the Tribunal.

(k) The Tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce sentence.

Article 25.

All official documents shall be produced, and all court proceedings conducted, in English, French and Russian, and in the language of the Defendant. So much of the record and of the proceedings may also be translated into the language of any country in which the Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers desirable in the interests of the justice and public opinion.

VI. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

Article 26.

The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence of any Defendant shall give the reasons on which it is based, and shall be final and not subject to review.

Article 27.

The Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a Defendant, on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be just.

Article 28.

In addition to any punishment imposed by it, the Tribunal shall have the right to deprive the convicted person of any stolen property and order its delivery to the Control Council for Germany.

Article 29.

In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out in accordance with the orders of the Control Council for Germany, which may at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentences, but may not increase the severity thereof. If the Control Council for Germany, after any Defendant has been convicted and sentenced, discovers fresh evidence which, in its opinion, would found a fresh charge against him, the Council shall report accordingly to the Committee established under Article 14 hereof, for such action as they may consider proper, having regard to the interests of justice.

VII. EXPENSES

Article 30.

The expenses of the Tribunal and of the Trials, shall be charged by the Signatories against the funds allotted for maintenance of the Control Council of Germany.

And just to be very clear who signed on for this, Eric, here we have the signatories to the London Charter:

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in quadruplicate in London this 8th day of August 1945 each in English, French and Russian, and each text to have equal authenticity.

For the Government of the United States of America

Robert H. Jackson

For the Provisional Government of the French Republic

Robert Falco

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Jowitt C.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

I. Nikitchenko

A. Trainin

I draw your attention particularly to Article 8, which short-circuits your "inquiry". There is of course the weasel clause "may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires," but that didn't stop the Tribunal from hanging Keitel.

I'm sure, Eric, that you know who Robert H. Jackson is, and what he stood for. I am equally sure he would be appalled at your current activity, and would want you, among many other Americans, to be tried at The Hague. I think you know how that would turn out.

Best wishes

Saturday, August 22, 2009

The Four Hundred Thousand — a Debate on Afghanistan



As part of the visit of NATO's Secretary General to Iceland, a debate may have been held on NATO policy in Afghanistan at the now derelict headquarters of the defunct Kaupthing Bank, in the previously lavish office of Hreidar Mar Sigurdsson, now resident in Luxembourg.


Secretary General visits Iceland

The NATO Secretary General, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, paid a visit to Iceland on 20 August 2009. This was Mr. Fogh Rasmussen’s first introductory visit to a NATO capital since his appointment as Secretary General in early August.

During his meeting with Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurdardóttir and with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Össur Skarphédinsson, Mr. Fogh Rasmussen discussed NATO’s priorities, especially Afghanistan, as well as the NATO-Russia relationship and the challenges that will need to be addressed in relation to the High North.

The Secretary General commended Iceland for its valuable contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, particularly the rehabilitation of the aviation sector. “Icelandalso contributed to our missions in the Balkans and these examples really demonstrate that even a small country can be a great ally. This is exactly how I consider Iceland”,said Mr. Fogh Rasmussen.

In a meeting with members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Parliament (Althingi), the Secretary General urged parliamentarians to engage actively in the ongoing process to develop a new Strategic Concept for NATO.