Tuesday, July 30, 2013

The American Centralized State takes its revenge...


...on Bradley Manning

"These men, largely private, were functioning on a level different from the foreign policy of the United States, and years later when New York Times reporter Neil Sheehan read through the entire documentary history of the war, that history known as the Pentagon Papers, he would come away with one impression above all, which was that the government of the United States was not what he had thought it was; it was as if there were an inner U.S. government, what he called 'a centralized state, far more powerful than anything else, for whom the enemy is not simply the Communists but everything else, its own press, its own judiciary, its own Congress, foreign and friendly governments - all these are potentially antagonistic. It had survived and perpetuated itself,' Sheehan continued, 'often using the issue of anti-Communism as a weapon against the other branches of government and the press, and finally, it does not function necessarily for the benefit of the Republic but rather for its own ends, its own perpetuation; it has its own codes which are quite different from public codes. Secrecy was a way of protecting itself, not so much from threats by foreign governments but from detection from its own population on charges of its own competence and wisdom.' Each succeeding Administration, Sheehan noted, was careful, once in office, not to expose the weaknesses of its predecessor.  After all, essentially the same people were running the governments, they had continuity to each other, and each succeeding Administration found itself faced with virtually the same enemies. Thus the national security apparatus kept its continuity, and every outgoing President tended to rally to the side of the incumbent President.

"Out of this of course came a willingness to use covert operations; it was a necessity of the times, to match the Communists, and what your own population and your own Congress did not know was not particularly important; it was almost better if they did not know..."

David Halberstam
The Best and The Brightest

Thursday, July 25, 2013

Meanwhile back at 联合国多维综合稳定特派团

















Nothing to see here folks, just keep moving. Mali is absolutely under control and rapidly evolving into a representative democracy.  What part of Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission  do people not get?
"There is a social revolution going on now in Vietnam.  They are not at the stage to say ’We the people,’ but when they do get to that stage, then things will be fine...”
General Paul Harkins in
The Best and the Brightest
by David Halberstam
pg 469-70




Wednesday, July 24, 2013

Sweden, Sixth of the Five Eyes

Six Eyes

(2009)watercolour on paper, 20x30cm. For Sale.



















Sweden Wiretapping Russia's International Traffic for the NSA

Rick Falvinge 
Earlier documents put in context with recent revelations show that Sweden has been systematically wiretapping Russia on behalf of the United States. This is clear after putting a number of previous questionable agreements and developments in context today. The question that remains is what Sweden gets in return.
See entire article.


See entire document.





















http://falkvinge.net/2013/07/07/documents-sweden-wiretapping-russias-international-traffic-for-the-nsa/
And now, Sweden?!
Also implicates Australia

Friday, July 19, 2013

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

Communications Security Establishment Canada is entirely legal and ethical...

...except when it isn't.


2011-2012 Annual Report

Limitations Imposed by Law on CSEC

Parts (a) and (b) of CSEC's mandate

CSEC's activities related to the collection of foreign signals intelligence and to the protection of electronic information and information infrastructures of importance to the Government of Canada are subject to three legislative limitations aimed at protecting Canadians' privacy:
  1. CSEC is prohibited from directing its foreign signals intelligence collection and IT security activities at Canadians, regardless of their location anywhere in the world, or at any person in Canada, regardless of their nationality;
  2. In conducting these activities, CSEC may unintentionally intercept a communication that originates or terminates in Canada in which the originator has a reasonable expectation of privacy, which is a "private communication" as defined by the Criminal Code. CSEC may use and retain a private communication obtained this way but only if it is essential to either international affairs, defence or security, or to identify, isolate or prevent harm to Government of Canada computer systems or networks [see "Five Eyes' Daisy Chain" weaselly claimed exemption] ; and 
  3. To provide a formal framework for the unintentional interception of private communications while conducting foreign signals intelligence collection or IT security activities, the National Defence Act requires express authorization by the Minister of National Defence. These are known as ministerial authorizations. The Minister may authorize the activities once he or she is satisfied that specific conditions provided for in the Act have been met, which includes assurances of how such unintentional interceptions of private communications would be handled should they arise.
Private Communication: "any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an originator who is in Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a person who is in Canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it, and includes any radio-based telephone communication that is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it" (section 183 of the Criminal Code).

Ministerial authorizations

When CSEC is conducting activities to acquire foreign signals intelligence, it cannot know beforehand with whom a targeted foreign entity outside Canada may communicate. Similarly, when CSEC is conducting activities to help protect Government of Canada computer systems, it cannot know beforehand who may communicate with or through that computer system. Given the complexity and interconnectedness of the global information infrastructure, it is unavoidable that CSEC will intercept a number of private communications. It is for this reason that CSEC requires a ministerial authorization for these activities — to shield itself from the Criminal Code in cases where it may unintentionally intercept a communication coming to or originating from Canada and where a person has an expectation of privacy. CSEC's ministerial authorizations relate to an "activity" or "class of activities" specified in the authorizations — that is, to a specific method of acquiring foreign signals intelligence or of protecting computer systems (the how); the authorizations do not relate to a specific individual or subject (the whom or the what).
Ministerial authorization: authorization provided in writing by the Minister of National Defence to CSEC so that CSEC is not in contravention of the Criminal Code if — in the conduct of foreign signals intelligence collection or IT security activities — it should unintentionally intercept a private communication. An authorization can be in effect for no longer than one year. In 2011–2012, there were six foreign signals intelligence collection and two IT security ministerial authorizations in effect.

Conditions for ministerial authorizations

To issue a ministerial authorization for foreign signals intelligence collection, the Minister must first be satisfied that:
  • the interception will be directed at foreign entities located outside of Canada;
  • the information could not be reasonably obtained by other means;
  • the expected value of the interception would justify it; and
  • satisfactory measures are in place to protect the privacy of Canadians and private communications will only be used or retained when essential to international affairs, defence or security.
To issue a ministerial authorization to protect the computer systems or networks of the Government of Canada, the Minister must be satisfied that:
  • the interception is necessary;
  • the information could not be reasonably obtained by other means;
  • the consent of persons whose private communications may be intercepted could not reasonably be obtained;
  • satisfactory measures are in place to ensure that only information essential to identify, isolate or prevent harm to Government of Canada computer systems or networks will be used or retained; and
  • satisfactory measures are in place to protect the privacy of Canadians in the use and retention of that information.
Each year, I review all of CSEC's ministerial authorizations — which may be in effect for a period of no longer than one year — to ensure that the activities are authorized and that the above conditions for authorization are met. I report to the Minister of National Defence on my review.

Part (c) of CSEC's mandate

For CSEC to provide assistance to federal law enforcement and security agencies in fulfilling their mandated activities, the National Defence Act requires that those agencies first demonstrate that they have the legal authority — such as an authorization or a warrant — to conduct the activities. CSEC is then subject to the same laws and limitations that govern the agencies it is assisting rather than to the three legislative limitations listed above. In addition, ministerial authorizations do not apply to these activities.

Five Eyes' Hell in Brussels

Excerpt from The War Diary of ISAF's Media Operations Centre NATO Headquarters Blvd Leopold III 1110 Brussels, Belgium. Wednesday, July 17, 2013 9:30 AM Au Repos de la Montagne, Montagne de Saint-Job 39. Coffee en route to work. There are days when Strategic Communication seems futile. Further hideous developments after revelations from the Snowden person.  Urgent phone call from Chief to co-ordinate Messaging. Meeting in the wine cellar of Le Wine Bar du Sablon, Rue Haute 198.  Hotel Metropole out because of massive security leak to NSA at last meeting.  Can't understand it.  11:00 AM in wine cellar.  Cozy bunker-like atmosphere.  Chief holding up well with champagne, it worked for Churchill. Apparently all NATO members have been bugging all of the other NATO members.  Quelle surprise.  Chief says Anglosphere has had lead in total hoovering of all the information in the world and storing it in a new bunker in Utah.  Never been to Utah.  Question is, how do we present a united front, given that nobody in NATO now trusts anybody else in NATO.  I suggest we compare it to a zoo at feeding time: everybody's in the same place but the only constant is the zoo-keepers.  Message rejected as being completely accurate. 1:00 PM.  Lunch served, followed by food. Excellent metaphor.  Irony lost on Chief. So much for English literature.  Maybe it doesn't work in French.  3:00 PM Coffee.  It's crunch time.  How in fact can we explain why it's essential for the NSA and its Five Eyes vassals to collect all the world's haystacks so as to keep citizens of NATO safe from Terrorism and other miscellaneous undesirable things by finding the needles in the haystacks at a later date when we have more time after a fresh disaster of some sort tells us where to look.  This will allow everybody to increase the power and reach of the secret agencies that have conspicuously failed to save anybody from anything despite the expenditure of about a femtillion dollars and/or Euros, and construct new cyber defences against dangerous Terrorists and of course, each other. The Chinese are a whole other story. 5:00 PM  Cocktails. Strategy hammered out. It was a very hammered strategy.  Adopted the tried and true plan of ignoring all of this mess as if it didn't exist, just like the last ISAF Commander's indiscretions didn't exist - forget his name for the moment - and concentrate on the latest positive news from Afghanistan. 7:00 Few staff still standing.  A day well spent.

Sunday, July 14, 2013

Canadian Carriers and Transparency Report

Robert Gibbs and "corruption of the blood"




SECTION 3.

Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.

Meanwhile, back in Waziristan....

Why was Snowden working in Hawaii?


Thursday, July 11, 2013

Insha'Allah Airlines

You...can't...make...this...shit...up.

The Man Who Never Was at The National Post

Who's Snowden?















National Post headlines for Wednesday, July 10, 2013

Interviewer: What are some of the big surveillance programs that are active today and how do international partners aid the NSA?
Snowden: In some cases, the so-called Five Eye Partners 4 go beyond what NSA itself does. For instance, the UK's General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has a system called TEMPORA. TEMPORA is the signals intelligence community's first "full-take" Internet buffer that doesn't care about content type and pays only marginal attention to the Human Rights Act. It snarfs everything, in a rolling buffer to allow retroactive investigation without missing a single bit. Right now the buffer can hold three days of traffic, but that's being improved. Three days may not sound like much, but remember that that's not metadata. "Full-take" means it doesn't miss anything, and ingests the entirety of each circuit's capacity. If you send a single ICMP packet and it routes through the UK, we get it. If you download something and the CDN (Content Delivery Network) happens to serve from the UK, we get it. If your sick daughter's medical records get processed at a London call center … well, you get the idea.

The possibility that the Canadian government is not aware of this seems preposterous.  The implications are appalling. The National Post seems oblivious

Tuesday, July 9, 2013

Total internet snarfing in Canada



















http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-spiegel-13-0707-en.htm


Interviewer: What are some of the big surveillance programs that are active today and how do international partners aid the NSA?

Snowden: In some cases, the so-called Five Eye Partners 4 go beyond what NSA itself does. For instance, the UK's General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has a system called TEMPORA. TEMPORA is the signals intelligence community's first "full-take" Internet buffer that doesn't care about content type and pays only marginal attention to the Human Rights Act. It snarfs everything, in a rolling buffer to allow retroactive investigation without missing a single bit. Right now the buffer can hold three days of traffic, but that's being improved. Three days may not sound like much, but remember that that's not metadata. "Full-take" means it doesn't miss anything, and ingests the entirety of each circuit's capacity. If you send a single ICMP packet and it routes through the UK, we get it. If you download something and the CDN (Content Delivery Network) happens to serve from the UK, we get it. If your sick daughter's medical records get processed at a London call center … well, you get the idea.

Interviewer: Is there a way of circumventing that?

Snowden: As a general rule, so long as you have any choice at all, you should never route through or peer with the UK under any circumstances. Their fibers are radioactive, and even the Queen's selfies to the pool boy get logged.


Monday, July 8, 2013

Canada's Press indifferent to mass interception and storage of Canadian internet traffic



''“The NSA doesn’t limit itself to foreign intelligence. It collects all communications that transit the United States. There are literally no ingress or egress points anywhere in the continental United States where a communication can enter or exit without being monitored and collected and analyzed.”

-Edward Snowden
Guardian interview
July 8 2013


















From the Order Paper Question archives: Do the "Five Eyes" watch each other?
by Kady O'Malley
With Jeffrey Delisle's surprise guilty plea drawing fresh attention to the "Five Eyes" intelligence alliance between the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, it may be worth revisiting the (largely overlooked at the time) reply to an Order Paper Question submitted by New Democrat MP Craig Scott last June.  

At the end of a wide-ranging series of questions on Canada's anti-terrorism strategy, Scott posed the following query:

Has Canada ever accepted communications intelligence from one of the traditional "Five Eyes" allies mentioned in Minister Toews' testimony from June 5, 2012, where that intelligence consisted of communications that took place between persons both or all of whom were within Canada at the time the communications occurred?
Courtesy of National Defence, here's what he got in response -- which, I must confess, despite multiple rereadings, still leaves me somewhat unsure of whether constitutes a 'yes' or a 'no' to what would seem to be a fairly simple question:

The Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) is prohibited by law from directing its activities at any person in Canada or Canadians anywhere, and cannot ask its international partners, including the Five Eyes allies, to act in ways that circumvent this legal restriction. Five Eyes allies, in their own national interests as sovereign states, can lawfully collect intelligence in accordance with their own domestic laws while respecting the long-standing convention not to target the communications of one another. 
With respect to Five Eyes reporting derived from a communication where both or all communicants were in Canada at the time the communication occurred; in accordance with CSEC's legal mandate CSEC does not pursue the receipt of such intelligence and has clearly expressed its expectations to partner agencies.
Sure. 

Monday, July 1, 2013

"Snowden Is Not the Story"


Walt Kelly - Pogo